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INTRODUCTION
It is a common enough story: a family rents a home, has months left
on the current lease, and pays every month’s rent on time, yet they wake up
one morning to find an eviction notice posted outside their home—or worse
still, a sheriff knocking at the door. Unbeknownst to them, the landlord
who owns the home fell behind on the mortgage, or paid too little in
property taxes, and the home is now in foreclosure. They may have lived
there for years as model tenants, doing everything asked of them by the
lease, but these facts are not important. Nor, in many cases, is their lack of
prior knowledge about the foreclosure or planned eviction.1 The tenant
family is only collateral damage.
This scenario plays out all over the country,2 across jurisdictions with
widely varying tenant protections. Its victims disproportionately live in
1

Many states require, at the minimum, that tenants be notified of the foreclosure or given extra
time before eviction. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1701(h) (2014) (requiring a supplemental
petition to evict any occupants not personally named in the foreclosure, and mandating up to a 120-day
delay before eviction). Other states have much less robust protection. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 426.530 (West, Westlaw through 2016 sess.) (permitting the purchaser at a foreclosure sale to
“receive an immediate writ of possession”).
2
See, e.g., Creola Johnson, Renters Evicted en Masse: Collateral Damage Arising from the
Subprime Foreclosure Crisis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 975, 975–76 (2010) (describing a case in Baltimore,
where state and federal law ultimately helped the tenant delay the eviction); Henry Rose, The Due
Process Rights of Residential Tenants in Mortgage Foreclosure Cases, 41 N.M. L. REV. 407, 407–08
(2011) (describing one such eviction in Chicago); Péralte C. Paul, Law Helps Renters Forced Out When
J.
CONST.
(Nov.
9,
2009,
6:37
AM),
Landlord
Defaults,
ATLANTA
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low- and middle-income households, precisely the groups most likely to
experience difficulty finding adequate and affordable new housing in an
increasingly expensive national rental market3—especially if they cannot
recoup the security deposit on their present home.4 In many jurisdictions,
they are also disproportionately minority households.5 Foreclosure-related
eviction of tenants, then, not only harms unsuspecting families and
exacerbates housing instability within the neighborhoods most impacted by
the foreclosure crisis, but also fits into a historical trajectory of housing
practices whose effect is to economically disenfranchise families of color.6
Scholars have advocated for additional anti-eviction protections through
common law doctrines7 or due process lawsuits,8 but these approaches have
had only incremental and intermittent success.9
One promising but unexplored avenue opened when, in March 2015,
the Supreme Court released its decision in Texas Department of Housing &
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/law-helps-renters-forced-out-when-landlord-default/nQY5Q/
[https://perma.cc/4ZRJ-B8WB] (describing a case in Sandy Springs, GA); Jim Piggott, Undisclosed
(Jul.
15,
2013,
10:00
PM),
Foreclosure;
Surprise
Eviction,
NEWS4JAX
http://www.news4jax.com/news/undisclosed-foreclosure-surprise-eviction/20986050 [https://perma.cc/
4WN9-4492] (describing a case in Jacksonville, FL).
3
See ALLISON CHARETTE ET AL., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV.,
PROJECTING TRENDS IN SEVERELY COST-BURDENED RENTERS: 2015–2025, at 6–7 (2015),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/KSPProd/ERC_Upload/0100886.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN4B-FNLB].
4
See Johnson, supra note 2, at 983 (“The overwhelming majority of renters are not refunded their
security deposits or the remainder of the current month’s rent previously paid to the landlord.”).
5
NAT’L COMM’N ON FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING:
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FAIR HOUSING AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 68 (2008),
http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/reports/future_of_fair_Housing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
2WFZ-GFCQ ] (“African Americans and Latinos—and neighborhoods of color—will bear the harshest
consequences of the foreclosure fallout.”).
6
For one of the most prominent recent discussions of the impact of historic American housing
practices on black Americans, tracing from slavery through segregation and redlining, see Ta-Nehisi
June
2014,
Coates,
The
Case
for
Reparations,
ATLANTIC,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631
[https://perma.cc/6X6K-UWGY].
7
See, e.g., Charles C. Cornelio, The Effect of Anti-Eviction Statutes on Foreclosing Mortgagees,
4 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 361, 368 (1985) (suggesting that the implied warranty of habitability should
protect tenants from interference by foreclosing banks); Florence Wagman Roisman, The Right to
Remain: Common Law Protections for Security of Tenure: An Essay in Honor of John Otis Calmore,
86 N.C. L. REV. 817, 819 (2008) (arguing that litigants should press for common law tenure security,
which requires a landlord to have good cause to terminate a tenancy); see also Gerald Korngold,
Whatever Happened to Landlord-Tenant Law?, 77 NEB. L. REV. 703, 708 (1998) (noting that the “shift
to a legislatively dominated regime” starting in the late 1970s left “fewer opportunities for breakthrough
judicial decisions”).
8
See, e.g., Rose, supra note 2, at 409 (arguing that due process requires protections beyond those
offered by the federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act, which expired following the article’s
publication).
9
Some states have recognized, for example, that a writ of assistance, which would allow a
foreclosing mortgagee to evict tenants not actually joined in the foreclosure, violates due process rights.
See, e.g., Gibbs v. Kinsey, 566 N.Y.S.2d 117, 117 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
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Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.10 In Inclusive
Communities, the Supreme Court held that the Fair Housing Act11
encompasses disparate impact liability for practices with discriminatory
effects, regardless of whether the practice has discriminatory intent.12 It was
hardly a watershed decision, as all eleven federal circuits that had
considered the question agreed on the viability of Fair Housing Act
disparate impact claims,13 but Inclusive Communities did serve several
important functions: it silenced commentators who took the granting of the
certiorari petition without a circuit split as a sign that the Fair Housing
Act’s disparate impact days were numbered, it clarified the applicable test,
and it reinforced the Court’s apparent hesitancy to apply the doctrine
broadly due to concerns over racial quotas and equal protection issues.14
This Note will argue that Fair Housing Act disparate impact after
Inclusive Communities can readily encompass tenants in foreclosure, even
under a relatively conservative interpretation of the doctrine.15 While the
Court has signaled a reticence toward broad expansions of the doctrine,
evictions of faultless tenants speak to the primary concerns of both
disparate impact theory and the Fair Housing Act, while avoiding the
Court’s central concerns about expansive application of the doctrine.
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I traces the evolution of
American renting habits and landlord–tenant law to accommodate modern
housing realities—a process that has largely overlooked tenants in
foreclosure. Part I also explores the foreclosure crisis and its aftermath, as
well as the often wide-ranging economic and personal cost for tenants in
foreclosed properties and their communities. In light of these trends, both
legislative action and common law doctrines have proven inadequate to
10

135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012)).
The Act made it illegal to deny or refuse housing based on protected categories, including race.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). For a more thorough discussion of the Act, see infra Section II.A.
12
135 S. Ct. at 2525.
13
See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM & SARA K. PRATT, NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALL., DISPARATE IMPACT
UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: A PROPOSED APPROACH 6–7 (2009) (detailing the most important
cases in all eleven numbered circuits endorsing disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act as of 2009,
as well as relevant case law in the D.C. Circuit).
14
135 S. Ct. at 2522–25 (describing the applicable test and its limits); id. at 2523 (noting “serious
constitutional concerns” with a too-broad application of disparate impact).
15
With any argument for extending the disparate impact doctrine, there is some risk of straying
into the realm of liberal wishful thinking. As noted by Professor Michael Selmi, “scholars have offered
numerous proposals to extend the disparate impact theory to cure all manner of social ills; extending the
disparate impact doctrine has long been one of the primary obsessions of liberal academics and
advocates alike.” Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
704 (2006). With such concerns in mind, this Note will attempt to justify tenant-in-foreclosure
applicability even under a narrow view of the disparate impact doctrine.
11
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bring tenant-in-foreclosure policies up to date with other important tenant
protections, disproportionately harming tenants of color through reliance on
outdated property principles.
Part II discusses the trajectory of disparate impact case law and its
application to the Fair Housing Act, as well as the relevant Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations, Inclusive
Communities, and other important housing disparate impact cases. Part III
then demonstrates that the Fair Housing Act, HUD regulations, and case
law all support applying disparate impact liability to the foreclosure-related
eviction of tenants with active leases. Part III shows that the Court’s recent
concerns about disparate impact suggest a first threshold step in
establishing a disparate impact case, and demonstrates that the case for
tenants in foreclosure satisfies both this initial step and the three-part
burden-shifting test from Inclusive Communities. Because foreclosure laws
and practices in many jurisdictions cause a statistical disparate impact, lack
legally sufficient justification, and have less discriminatory alternatives, the
Fair Housing Act provides a potentially powerful weapon against sudden
displacement of renters in foreclosed properties.
I.

RENTERS AND THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
A. A Crisis in Tenant Security

In 2015, the U.S. homeownership rate fell to its lowest level since
1967.16 Due to a combination of tightened financing for homebuyers,17 lack
of personal savings,18 poor credit,19 and changing demographics,20 more and
16

Kathleen M. Howley, U.S. Homeownership Rate Falls to the Lowest Level Since the 1960s,
BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2015, 9:14 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-28/u-shomeownership-rate-falls-to-lowest-since-the-1960s [https://perma.cc/4KNA-LSQ3].
17
See, e.g., Dina ElBoghdady, Is the Government Making It Harder for the Middle Class to Buy
Homes?, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/09/05/
when-the-government-makes-it-harder-for-the-middle-class-to-buy-houses
[https://perma.cc/9UMKLSHK] (noting that “lenders are turning away potential home buyers by demanding unusually high
credit scores and other tough standards” beyond what the government requires).
18
Andrew L. Yarrow, Americans Low Savings Rate a Bad Sign for Good Economy, FISCAL TIMES
(Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/04/26/Americans-Low-Savings-Rate-Bad-SignGood-Economy [https://perma.cc/2A42-KZ9Y] (“Forty-four percent of Americans are either in debt,
have no savings at all, or have only enough savings to tide them over for up to three months if they lose
their jobs . . . .”).
19
See, e.g., Dionne Searcey, More Americans Are Renting, and Paying More, as Homeownership
Falls, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/24/business/economy/moreamericans-are-renting-and-paying-more-as-homeownership-falls.html [https://perma.cc/3GUM-ELDQ]
(“Many people living in rentals were once owners; they lost their homes to foreclosure and now have
such damaged credit reports that they find it nearly impossible to qualify for a mortgage.”).
20
Immigration, geographic mobility (especially among millennials), and the growing income gap
have all had significant impact on American rental trends. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF
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more Americans are renting their homes.21 This trend seems poised to
continue, even as rental costs reach historic highs.22 In short, renting is no
longer—if it ever was—a temporary stepping stone to the American Dream
of homeownership. It is a fixture of American life, particularly for lower
income families and people of color.23
The rising cost of renting, coupled with a shortage of affordable rental
stock in many cities,24 make it increasingly difficult to locate affordable
housing—particularly on short notice, as when a sudden eviction causes
involuntary displacement. Beyond the logistics of securing new housing,
this involuntary displacement takes a well-documented psychic and social
toll on families and communities alike.25 Thankfully for renters, various
common law and statutory safeguards protect against invidious disruption
of tenancies.
The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw some incremental
expansion in tenants’ rights, but courts and legislatures generally provided
scant protection for tenants facing conditions or habitability issues,26 and
the common law in many jurisdictions still upheld the right of landlords to

HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY 5–9
(2008),
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/rh08_americas_rental_housing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U8VM-6V4R].
21
CHARETTE ET AL., supra note 3, at 6 (“We are now seeing more renters than at any other time in
U.S. history.”).
22
Id. at 6 (observing that in 2013, nearly half of all renters were “cost burdened,” paying more than
30% of their income on housing costs—roughly double the rate in 1960); see also id. at 9 (“Since 1982,
with the exception of a five-year period in the late 1990s, rent growth has consistently outpaced
inflation.”); Emily Badger, Why the Homeownership Rate Will Keep Falling—and Falling, and Falling,
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/
06/16/why-the-homeownership-rate-will-keep-falling-and-falling-and-falling/ [https://perma.cc/QY6TQ58Z] (noting that the growth in rental households is expected to continue through 2030).
23
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: MEETING
CHALLENGES, BUILDING ON OPPORTUNITIES 17 (2011), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/
jchs.harvard.edu/files/ahr2011-3-demographics.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D2P5-3JPR]
(“By
2010,
approximately 70 percent of renter households had incomes below the national median and more than
40 percent had incomes in the bottom quartile.”); id. at 16 (“In 2000, 39 percent of renters were
minorities. From 2001 to 2010, minorities contributed 81 percent of the 3.9 million growth in the
number of renter households.”).
24
See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 20, at 13.
25
See, e.g., Marc Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation, in URBAN
RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 359, 359–61 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966); Roisman,
supra note 7, at 820–29.
26
See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C.
L. REV 503, 516 (1982) (describing nineteenth-century common law, which required rent payments
even if the property was destroyed by fire or flood); Paul Sullivan, Note, Security of Tenure for the
Residential Tenant: An Analysis and Recommendations, 21 VT. L. REV. 1015, 1029 (1997) (observing
that the move toward housing condition-based tenant protections started in earnest after the Great
Depression).

244

111:239 (2016)

Rental Home Sweet Home

evict tenants through self-help.27 The 1960s and 1970s saw significant
shifts in landlord–tenant law,28 particularly in the popularization of tenantfavorable common law doctrines,29 the influence of the nonbinding
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,30 increased recognition of
tenants’ due process rights against eviction,31 and Congress’s passage of the
Fair Housing Act, which outlawed rental discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.32
This reevaluation of tenants’ rights has not, however, been extended to
the foreclosure context.33 Under the traditional property regime, tenants in
foreclosure generally landed on the short end of the “first in time, first in
right” principle: if the mortgage on a home predated the lease—which is
usually the case—the lease became subordinate to the mortgage, so the
foreclosure extinguished the lease and the tenant had no remaining right to
the property.34 The national property regime has since seen a change toward

27

See, e.g., Smith v. Reeder, 28 P. 890, 891 (Or. 1892) (“[A landlord] may enter and expel the
tenant by force, without being liable to an action of tort for damages, either for his entry upon the
premises, or for an assault in expelling the tenant, provided he uses no more force than is necessary and
does no wanton damage.”).
28
This shift has often been interpreted as a move from traditional property principles to contract
principles in the landlord–tenant relationship. See, e.g., Cornelio, supra note 7, at 368 (“[C]ourts found
contract law a more suitable model than property law for determining the rights and obligations of
parties under residential leases.”). But see Glendon, supra note 26, at 503–04 (arguing that the
“revolution” in landlord–tenant law was in fact only a culmination of various general legal doctrines
that began to gain popularity in the twentieth century).
29
These doctrines include the implied warranty of habitability, which makes the tenant’s obligation
to pay rent conditional on the landlord’s maintenance of the premises in habitable condition, and
protection against retaliatory eviction. See Javins v. First Nat. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (reading an implied warranty of habitability into the housing code); Schweiger v. Superior
Court, 476 P.2d 97, 103 (Cal. 1970) (finding an implied right against retaliatory eviction in California).
30
UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1974); see State Adoptions
of URLTA Provisions, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/documents/
environ/STURLTAprov.pdf [https://perma.cc/KA5X-43Q8] (summarizing the Model Act’s major
provisions and how many state legislatures adopted, modified, or rejected those provisions).
31
See, e.g., La. State Museum v. Mayberry, 348 So. 2d 1274, 1276 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (holding
that improperly served termination notice violated a tenant’s due process rights).
32
Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 804, 82 Stat. 81, 83 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604
(2012)).
33
Cf. Korngold, supra note 7, at 708 (noting that the tide of significant new developments in
landlord–tenant law lost steam in the late 1970s).
34
There is scant pre-1900s case law regarding tenants in foreclosure, but it was well established
that a tenant’s rights to property necessarily extinguished along with the landlord’s. See, e.g.,
McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580, 590 (Cal. 1860) (“The right of the lessor to the possession ends with
the sale of the premises, or rather, with the deed by which the sale is consummated. The right of the
tenant to such possession depends upon that of the lessor and goes with it.”); Barclay v. Picker, 38 Mo.
143, 145 (1866) (“As a general rule, whenever the estate which the lessor had at the time of making the
lease is defeated or determined, the lease is extinguished with it.”).
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embracing parties’ contractual rights and duties35 over archaic subordinateinterest principles, and several states’ laws already affirm the right of leases
to continue after foreclosure.36 Nonetheless, some courts still hold to a strict
interpretation of the “first in time, first in right” principle, which, in
addition to extinguishing leases and allowing immediate eviction, also
effectively strips tenants’ due process rights by rendering them trespassers
in their own homes once the foreclosure is completed.37 Even if courts do
not consider these tenants trespassers, many state laws still allow extremely
short-notice evictions. According to the National Low Income Housing
Coalition, as of 2015 thirty states had either no statutorily specified
protection or required five or fewer days’ notice before tenants in
foreclosed properties may be evicted.38 Despite the lease-destabilizing
effect of the lease subordination rule and the inadequacy of other state
laws, little effort was made on a national level to create updated protections
for tenants in foreclosure until 2008, when a sudden boom in residential
foreclosures brought foreclosure issues to the foreground of legal and
policy debates.39

35

See Korngold, supra note 7, at 705; Sullivan, supra note 26, at 1028 (suggesting that this shift
began in the nineteenth century when “the national economy shifted from farming to industry”). But see
Priya S. Gupta, The American Dream, Deferred: Contextualizing Property After the Foreclosure Crisis,
73 MD. L. REV. 523, 525–29 (2014) (discussing how this modern tendency to “treat houses primarily as
investments codified in contracts” can itself be dangerous).
36
Various state laws directly contravene the lease-extinguishing power of foreclosure. See Vicki
Been & Allegra Glashausser, Tenants: Innocent Victims of the Nation’s Foreclosure Crisis, 2 ALB.
GOV’T L. REV. 1, 16–19 (2009) (describing state regimes in New Jersey, New Hampshire, California,
and Washington, D.C., which provide various levels of additional protection). As will be discussed in
Section I.B, the federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, which expired at the end of
2014, provided a national (though temporary) solution. Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 702, 123 Stat. 1660,
1660–61 (2009) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5220 (2012)).
37
See, e.g., Mik v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 743 F.3d 149, 163 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that,
under Kentucky law, a purchaser of foreclosed properties “may treat persons who occupy the property
pursuant to a pre-existing lease as tenants, in which case he may charge them rent, or as trespassers, in
which case he may evict them” via writ of possession, without filing an eviction action); Mills v.
County of Lapeer, 498 F. App’x 507, 514 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a tax deed foreclosure can
convert into a trespasser a tenant who does not have a property interest, and that the tenant therefore
lacks due process rights, such as a right to a pre-eviction hearing).
38
NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., PROTECTING TENANTS AT FORECLOSURE ACT (2015),
http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/FactSheet_PTFA_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9CG-ABKS] (citing
data from the National Housing Law Project).
39
See James H. Carr & Kate Davidoff, Legislative and Regulatory Responses to the Foreclosure
Crisis, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 283, 286–88 (2008) (describing the first
wave of Federal Reserve and legislative responses, as they stood in early 2008).
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B. A Foreclosure Epidemic, on Renters and Owners Alike
The United States subprime mortgage crisis saw mortgage foreclosure
rates rise to historic levels.40 Much of the attention given to the crisis has
focused on its potential causes, and particularly on the predatory lending
practices that led to many homeowners taking on loans they could not
afford to pay.41 These practices themselves have been found to single out
and disproportionately affect minority neighborhoods,42 and several efforts
have been made to challenge lenders through litigation (including on the
grounds that lending practices had a disparate impact on minorities).43
Less attention has been paid to the impact of the foreclosure crisis on
renters, who by some estimations constitute 40% of all Americans
displaced by foreclosure.44 Some of this disparity in public attention may
trace to class attitudes: middle- and upper-class Americans, in addition to
renting less often and being less likely to face foreclosure themselves, are

40

See LAWRENCE H. WHITE, CATO INST., HOW DID WE GET INTO THIS FINANCIAL MESS? 2
(2008), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/bp110.pdf [https://perma.cc/XU8W-TENC].
The subprime mortgage crisis was, of course, entwined with a larger global financial crisis, and there is
disagreement over when the housing crisis started and ended, with some observers suggesting that it is
still ongoing. See, e.g., Paul Solman, Why the Foreclosure Crisis Isn’t Over Yet, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept.
24,
2015,
4:45
PM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/foreclosure-crisis-isnt-yet
[https://perma.cc/K37E-4HUQ]; Diana Olick, Repossessions Spike 66% as Foreclosure Crisis Lingers,
CNBC (Oct. 15, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/14/repossessions-spike-66-asforeclosure-crisis-lingers.html [https://perma.cc/XJ2W-L75L].
41
See, e.g., Alex Kotlowitz, All Boarded Up, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 4, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/magazine/08Foreclosure-t.html [https://perma.cc/6M54-MSLW];
Nelson D. Schwartz, Can the Mortgage Crisis Swallow a Town?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/business/yourmoney/02village.html
[https://perma.cc/HT3J5LGQ].
42
The National Low Income Housing Coalition found in 2009 that renters in minority communities
were disproportionately impacted by the foreclosure crisis. DANILO PELLETIERE, NAT’L LOW INCOME
HOUS. COAL., RENTERS IN FORECLOSURE: DEFINING THE PROBLEM, IDENTIFYING SOLUTIONS 4 (2009),
http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Renters-in-Foreclosure-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR59-TEFA]. The
Coalition confirmed this same trend again in 2012. SHAMBHAVI MANGLIK, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS.
COAL., RENTERS IN FORECLOSURE: A FRESH LOOK AT AN ONGOING PROBLEM 7 (2012),
http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Renters_in_Foreclosure_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8MY-6MK5];
see also Nick Carey, Racial Predatory Loans Fueled U.S. Housing Crisis: Study, REUTERS (Oct. 4,
2010,
7:44
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/04/us-usa-foreclosures-raceidUSTRE6930K520101004#MuQo2XWmWS3e7Lpr.97 [https://perma.cc/F3S3-A6H8] (describing a
study that found race to be a “powerful predictor[]” of subprime mortgage-related foreclosure).
43
See Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for the Rise in
Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1169, 1187–232 (2008). Johnson’s article
discusses several cities’ efforts to sue lenders, including a disparate impact case against Wells Fargo by
the city of Baltimore. Id. at 1198–212. This suit later settled, along with several other concurrent suits
against the bank. Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Bias Charges, N.Y. TIMES (July 12,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/business/wells-fargo-to-settle-mortgage-discriminationcharges.html [https://perma.cc/JY2L-2WKB].
44
See MANGLIK, supra note 42, at 1.
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more financially capable of finding new rental housing,45 so they may see
loss of rental property as a less serious or pervasive problem than poorer
tenants. This indifferent attitude reflects the last few decades of housing
policy, which has increasingly prized the investment-asset value of
homeownership over more holistic conceptions of “home.”46
A sudden eviction from one’s rented home poses a myriad of serious
risks, particularly for lower income renters. Several scholars have
documented at length the potential consequences of forced relocation on
tenants, including school instability (which harms children’s academic
performance), division of families, and severe emotional distress.47 Tenants
evicted from foreclosed properties are unable to recoup their security
deposits in as many as 80% of cases, and one study found that the “average
family involved in a rental foreclosure filing faces $2,558 in costs.”48
Without savings or family members to stay with, they face a particularly
high risk of homelessness.49 Damage to neighborhoods from the resultant
abandoned properties includes an increase in crime, elevated fire risk, a
reduction in nearby property values, and a loss of local economic
opportunity.50 Properties taken over by foreclosing banks are often

45

See Johnson, supra note 2, at 983 (detailing the problems that lack of savings, a low credit rating,
and high urban rental costs can pose).
46
See Gupta, supra note 35, at 528–29.
47
See Roisman, supra note 7, at 820–29; see also Fried, supra note 25, at 359–61 (describing the
emotional impact of forced relocation on the residents of a West End Boston neighborhood, who
reported a “moderate or extreme sense of loss and an accompanying affective reaction of grief”).
48
DAVID ROTHSTEIN, POLICY MATTERS OHIO, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: RENTERS IN THE
FORECLOSURE CRISIS 10–11 (2008), http://www.policymattersohio.org/wp-content/uploads/
2011/09/CollateralDamage2008_0619.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QX4-8MU3]. Professor Creola Johnson
also explains the economic consequences of lower income renters losing their security deposits:
Without such a refund, tenants will need to quickly find enough money to pay a new security
deposit, along with the first and, sometimes, last month’s rent. Besides security deposits, tenants
need cash to cover moving expenses and utility deposits to obtain utility services at the new
place. However, due to the current contraction of consumer credit, tenants may find reasonably
priced credit unattainable and may resort to usurious credit such as payday loans in order to
obtain cash to cover all of the relocation costs.
Johnson, supra note 2, at 983.
49
See NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS ET AL., FORECLOSURE TO HOMELESSNESS 2009: THE
FORGOTTEN VICTIMS OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 14 (2009), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/
advocacy/ForeclosuretoHomelessness0609.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2UJ-DT4C] (“Those who have been
living in foreclosed rental units are at particular risk, and have come to rank heavily among those who
have become homeless.”).
50
See James J. Kelly, Jr., Refreshing the Heart of the City: Vacant Building Receivership as a Tool
for Neighborhood Revitalization and Community Empowerment, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 210, 210 (2004) (“[E]ach vacant building provides a haven for illegal activity,
presents fire dangers to adjacent homes, and defames the surrounding neighborhood as an unfit place to
live.”); Anne B. Shlay & Gordon Whitman, Research for Democracy: Linking Community Organizing
and Research to Leverage Blight Policy, 5 CITY & COMMUNITY 153, 162 (2006) (“[A]bandoned
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inadequately maintained, particularly in minority communities.51 Moreover,
renters are not responsible for the default that causes foreclosure,52 and due
to their short notice and regular lack of inclusion in the foreclosure
proceedings, they often have little or no time to prepare to relocate.53
In 2009, Congress responded to the mass eviction of tenants in
foreclosure by enacting the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (PTFA),
which provided a national standard of protection for tenants in foreclosed
properties.54 These protections included at least ninety days’ advance notice
before evicting tenants with bona fide leases and provisions for some
tenants to live out the term of their leases.55 The PTFA, however, included
a sunset clause, rendering it only a stopgap measure at the height of the
foreclosure crisis.56 Congress allowed the PTFA to expire at the end of
2014, leaving many tenants again subject to inadequate state eviction
laws.57
A potentially powerful solution to this legislative inattention arose a
few months later, when the Supreme Court released its decision in Texas
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc., affirming the viability of disparate impact litigation under the
Fair Housing Act.58 As this Note will demonstrate in Parts II and III,
disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act, as interpreted and limited by
housing within 450 feet of property (about the size of a typical city block) lowered sales prices in the
range of $3,542–7,627, all else equal.”).
51
See NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALL. ET AL., THE BANKS ARE BACK—OUR NEIGHBORHOODS ARE NOT:
DISCRIMINATION IN THE MAINTENANCE AND MARKETING OF REO PROPERTIES 2 (2012),
http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/portals/33/the_banks_are_back_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Q2AB6YA].
52
Foreclosed homeowners may certainly be the victims of predatory lending practices, but the fact
remains that foreclosure necessarily has a direct connection to a homeowner’s action or non-action:
whether the terms of the loan are predatory or fair, the homeowner still “triggered” the risk of
foreclosure by non-payment of the mortgage.
53
See Been & Glashausser, supra note 36, at 15–16.
54
Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 702, 123 Stat. 1660, 1660–61 (2009) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5220 (2012)).
55
Id. § 702(a)(1). The Act defines a “bona fide” tenancy as one negotiated between nonfamily
members, at arms length, for fair market rent. Id. § 702(b). Bona fide leases entered into before the
notice of foreclosure were protected, except when the purchasers planned to use the premises as a
primary residence, in which case ninety-day notice was sufficient. Id. § 702(a).
56
Id. § 704. The original sunset date was December 31, 2012, but in 2010 Congress extended the
sunset date to December 31, 2014. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. 111–203, § 1484, 124 Stat. 1376, 2204 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2012)).
57
See Christopher A. Richardson, Tenants Are Left in the Cold After the Sunset of the Protecting
Tenants in Foreclosure Act, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/tenants-are-left-cold-after-sunset-protecting-tenants-foreclosure-act
[https://perma.cc/BTP7XEF2]; Been & Glashausser, supra note 36, at 7 (“New owners have significant success in removing
even tenants protected by federal or state laws.”).
58
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015).
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Inclusive Communities, provides an important opportunity for minority
tenants to claim meaningful protections against foreclosure-related
eviction.
II. DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
A. Disparate Impact: “Fair in Form, but Discriminatory in Operation”
The Supreme Court first endorsed the theory of disparate impact in
1971, with its seminal decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.59 In Griggs, a
group of black employees claimed that their employer’s use of intelligence
tests and high school diploma requirements to inform job placement
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,60 because such practices
“operate[d] to disqualify Negroes at a substantially higher rate than white
applicants.”61 The Court unanimously found that both the diploma and
testing requirements violated Title VII: “If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited,” regardless of whether the
employer actually intended to disadvantage black employees.62 This theory
of liability stood in stark contrast to claims based on the Equal Protection
Clause63 or Title VII disparate treatment,64 which both require proof of an
intent to discriminate.
As interpreted by later cases, Griggs set out a three-step burdenshifting analysis.65 First, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a
prima facie case that a statistical disparate impact exists, and that the

59

401 U.S. 424, 431–32 (1971).
Title VII made it illegal for an employer to discriminate against, segregate, or classify an
employee or applicant “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Pub.
L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 253, 255–57 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2
(2012)).
61
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426.
62
Id. at 431–32.
63
See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (noting that a law is not “invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of
another,” but requires further proof of invidious discrimination).
64
See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
(explaining that disparate treatment is a question of discriminatory motive). Other courts had previously
found Title VII to outlaw employment practices with discriminatory effects, for example, Local 189,
United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 996–97 (5th Cir. 1969), but Griggs legitimized the
rule.
65
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577–78 (2009); Town of Huntington v. Huntington
Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 17–18 (1988) (per curiam).
60
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impact was caused by the challenged practice.66 If this burden is met, the
defendant bears the burden of production to show that the challenged
practice is a “business necessity” and “related to job performance.”67
Finally, if the defendant successfully argues the business necessity of the
practice, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that
nondiscriminatory alternatives are available to achieve the same end.68
The Griggs rule proscribes practices that are “fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation” and lack a “genuine business need,”69 but
today its scope of applicability is debatable.70 Scholars still regularly lament
or applaud the doctrine’s relatively limited impact (at least compared to
what some have advocated),71 as well as the Court’s refusal, in Washington
v. Davis, to endow the doctrine with constitutional significance through the
Equal Protection Clause.72
The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts further limited the doctrine in
several areas.73 In Alexander v. Sandoval,74 the Court held that Title VI of
66

Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 & n.6; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975) (interpreting Griggs to require that a “complaining party or class has made out a prima facie case
of discrimination” before the case can proceed).
67
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
68
See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425.
69
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431–32.
70
See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 493, 530 (2003) (“[T]he Court in cases after Griggs did not hold firmly to Griggs’s aggressive
view of disparate impact doctrine.”). Today there are widely varying interpretations of how broad
disparate impact’s reach is or should be. Section II.B and Part III will discuss these variations in the
housing context and their implications for a potential tenants-in-foreclosure case.
71
Notably, several major recent academic movements focus on the notion that, as forms of overt
discrimination become less socially acceptable, it is increasingly important to recognize and address
buried or unconscious forms of systemic discrimination. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew, Seeing Subtle Racism,
6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 183, 217–18 (2010) (arguing that implicit “modern racism” should be
incorporated into employment discrimination models); Justin D. Cummins, Refashioning the Disparate
Treatment and Disparate Impact Doctrines in Theory and in Practice, 41 HOW. L.J. 455, 457–58, 467–
72 (1998) (suggesting that disparate impact should be reevaluated to include instances of white
privilege, subtle injustices, and other systemic disparities); Jonathan Feingold & Karen Lorang,
Defusing Implicit Bias, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 210, 228 (2012) (arguing that, due to implicit
biases, blacks are more likely to be victims of violence than whites); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein,
The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 973 (2006) (discussing the “possibility of using the
law to ‘debias’ people in order to reduce implicit bias”). For other suggested disparate impact
applications, see infra note 119.
72
426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the [Equal Protection Clause of the]
Constitution.”); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319–20 (1987) (detailing common critical reactions to the
“motive-centered doctrine” articulated in Davis).
73
It is worth noting that the Roberts Court did extend the right to disparate impact liability under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228,
236–40 (2005) (plurality opinion), but denied recovery due to a reasonable “nonage factor” as provided
under the statute. Id. at 239, 241; see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 4, 29
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which generally forbade “discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,”75 did
not itself contemplate a private right of action for disparate impact claims,
requiring separate statutory authorization.76 More significantly for the
doctrine itself, a series of cases suggested a growing concern that disparate
impact might come into conflict with both the Equal Protection Clause and
disparate treatment doctrine—effectively inverting the various pre-Davis
calls to read disparate impact into the Equal Protection Clause itself.77
This series of cases culminated in Ricci v. DeStefano,78 a Title VII
disparate treatment case that nonetheless had significant implications for
disparate impact doctrine. In that case, the City of New Haven,
Connecticut, administered a test to determine which of the City’s
firefighters qualified for promotions.79 White applicants outperformed
minority applicants, and under threat of lawsuit from both sides,80 the City
decided to discard the test results.81 In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that
the City’s decision to discard the test was a violation of Title VII’s
prohibition on disparate treatment.82 Even though the decision was made to
avoid disparate impact liability, it was based consciously on race (engaging
in disparate treatment), and the employer lacked a “strong basis in evidence
that the test was deficient and that discarding the results [was] necessary to
avoid violating the disparate-impact provision.”83 While the Court declined
to rule on equal protection grounds, many observers echoed Justice Scalia,
who wrote separately that the majority was “merely postpon[ing] the evil
U.S.C. § 623(f) (2012) (making an exception for discrimination “based on reasonable factors other than
age”). It is possible that the arguably lower bar to defend a policy with disparate impact under the
ADEA gave the Court less pause than, for example, the strict business necessity requirement under
employment discrimination case law.
74
532 U.S. 275 (2001).
75
Pub. L. No. 833-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 252, 252 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012)).
76
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293.
77
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), a plurality of the Court expressed
concern over the doctrine placing “undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic
measures,” or requiring unconstitutional use of racial quotas. Id. at 992–93. Outside of disparate impact,
the Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007), rejected the use of a race-based “tiebreaker” to determine school placement, id. at 733–35, and
yielded a memorable if tautological statement of principle from Chief Justice Roberts: “The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” Id. at 748.
78
557 U.S. 557 (2009).
79
Id. at 562.
80
If, on the one hand, the City kept the tests in place, it could face a Griggs-type disparate impact
lawsuit. On the other hand, if it discarded the tests based on racial considerations, it could face disparate
treatment or equal protection claims.
81
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 562.
82
Id. at 593.
83
Id. at 584.
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day” when equal protection concerns will collide with disparate impact
doctrine.84
Ricci set a confusing precedent, seemingly limiting disparate impact
liability without articulating a clear limiting principle. As Section II.B
demonstrates, the Court’s next major disparate impact decision, Texas
Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc., incorporated some of Ricci’s concerns without fully
clarifying their import.
B. Fair Housing Act Disparate Impact and Inclusive Communities
The Fair Housing Act, enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968,85 makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a
bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”86 As early as
1974, federal circuit courts interpreted the Act to prohibit disparate impact
in housing practices, as Title VII did in the employment sphere.87 A Fair
Housing Act disparate impact case did reach the Supreme Court in 1988, in
Town of Huntington. v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, but both parties
conceded to the applicability of the disparate impact test, so the Court did
not address the question.88
The Court did not directly address disparate impact under the Fair
Housing Act until 2015, in Texas Department of Housing & Community
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.89 In that case, a Texas-based
nonprofit, the Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), claimed that Texas had
disproportionally allocated federal low-income housing tax credits90 to

84

Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring). For a thorough analysis of the history of—and tension
between—disparate impact and the Equal Protection Clause, see Primus, supra note 70. Primus
describes three “rounds” of the relationship between the two doctrines: first, asking whether equal
protection contemplates disparate impact liability; second, asking whether Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to enact laws prohibiting practices with disparate impact;
and third, asking whether equal protection forbids Congress from enacting such laws. Id. at 494–96.
85
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012)).
86
Id. § 3604.
87
The first major Fair Housing Act disparate impact decision came in United States v. City of
Black Jack, which struck down a city ordinance that prohibited construction of any multifamily
dwellings as having a disparate impact on black residents. 508 F.2d 1179, 1186–88 (8th Cir. 1974); see
also Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1294–95 (7th Cir. 1977)
(holding that a zoning decision with discriminatory effects is actionable under the Fair Housing Act,
and remanding with instructions for factual findings about these effects).
88
488 U.S. 15, 18 (1988) (per curiam).
89
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
90
See 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2012).
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predominantly black urban neighborhoods, with very few allocated to
white suburban neighborhoods.91 According to ICP, this practice had a
disparate impact on black residents by perpetuating racial segregation.92
The district court applied a two-step analysis taken from the Second
Circuit’s decision in Huntington: first, ICP had to make a prima facie case
demonstrating statistical disparate impact, then the defendant needed to
show that its actions furthered a legitimate governmental interest with no
“less discriminatory alternative[].”93
The defendant Department appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Between the
district and appellate court decisions, however, HUD released regulations
reinforcing its embrace of disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act, and
articulating a three-part test that split the second “step” of the district
court’s analysis into two parts.94 In HUD’s regulation, which roughly
mirrored the three-step burden-shifting framework from the Griggs line of
cases, the plaintiff bore the burden of demonstrating less-discriminatory
alternative practices once the defendant proved a legitimate interest95
(whereas in the district court the Department carried that burden). The Fifth
Circuit followed the 2013 HUD regulations, and reversed and remanded for
the district court to apply the HUD-sanctioned test.96 The Department
appealed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari limited to the question whether disparate impact claims are
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.97
In the five years before Inclusive Communities, the Roberts Court had
granted certiorari in two other disparate impact cases brought under the
Fair Housing Act, one in 2011 and one in 2013, but both cases settled

91

135 S. Ct. at 2514.
Id.
93
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 860 F. Supp. 2d 312,
322–23 & n.17 (N.D. Tex. 2012); see also Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington,
844 F.2d 926, 939 (2d Cir.), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam).
94
HUD’s regulations proscribe practices that “actually or predictably result[] in a disparate
impact,” unless the practices are “necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate,
nondiscriminatory interests” that “could not be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory
effect.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a)–(b) (2016). It is worth noting that HUD officially supported disparate
impact liability in the lending context as early as 1994. See Policy Statement on Discrimination in
Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266, 18,269 (Apr. 15, 1994). For a more thorough history of HUD’s recent
approach to disparate impact, see SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 13, at 4–6.
95
24 C.F.R. § 100.500.
96
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 275, 282–83
(5th Cir. 2014).
97
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513
(2015); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014)
(granting certiorari).
92
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before any decision.98 By granting certiorari a third time in five years, the
Court seemed to suggest it was eager to weigh in on the issue. Moreover,
by this point all eleven numbered federal circuits that had addressed the
question agreed that the Fair Housing Act allowed disparate impact
claims,99 and HUD had recently promulgated its regulation explicitly
interpreting the Act to envision disparate impact liability.100 The repeated
certiorari grants, the lack of a circuit split, and the 2013 HUD regulations
led many observers to conclude that disparate impact liability under the
Fair Housing Act was doomed.101
Ultimately, the Supreme Court defied these expectations by holding—
albeit by a one-vote margin102—that the Act’s statutory language
envisioned disparate impact liability.103 The Court affirmed the Fifth
Circuit, and agreed with its incorporation of the HUD-approved burdenshifting test:
[A] plaintiff first must make a prima facie showing of disparate impact. . . .
If a statistical discrepancy is caused by factors other than the defendant’s
policy, a plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case, and there is no
liability. After a plaintiff does establish a prima facie showing of disparate
impact, the burden shifts to the defendant to “prov[e] that the challenged
practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate,
nondiscriminatory interests. . . .” Once a defendant has satisfied its burden at
step two, a plaintiff may “prevail upon proving that the substantial,

98

Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), and
cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012); Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of
Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), and cert. dismissed,
134 S. Ct 636 (2013).
99
See SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 13, at 6–7.
100
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
11,460, 11,482 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2016)) (“Liability may be established
under the Fair Housing Act based on a practice’s discriminatory effect . . . .”).
101
See, e.g., Cornelius J. Murray IV, Promoting “Inclusive Communities”: A Modified Approach
to Disparate Impact Under the Fair Housing Act, 75 LA. L. REV. 213, 216–17 (2014) (“[T]he Supreme
Court appears destined to read disparate impact theory out of the FHA.”); Emily Badger, The Supreme
Court May Soon Disarm the Single Best Weapon for Desegregating U.S. Housing, WASH. POST:
WONKBLOG (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/01/21/thesupreme-court-may-soon-disarm-the-single-best-weapon-for-desegregating-u-s-housing/ [https://perma.
cc/U8FF-5BLQ].
102
In dissent, Justice Alito argued that the Act categorically does not create disparate impact
liability. Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas wrote a
separate dissent contending that the Griggs holding, and the disparate impact doctrine in general, should
be dismantled. Id. at 2526–32 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
103
Id. at 2525 (majority opinion). As justification, the Court reasoned that the “results-oriented”
phrase “otherwise make unavailable” in 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(a), included both intentional discrimination
and actions that have disparate impact on protected groups, since the phrase “refers to the consequences
of an action rather than the actor’s intent.” Id. at 2518.
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legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice
could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”104

Despite endorsing disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act,
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion is suffused with caveats and cautionary
language about straying from what he called the “heartland of disparateimpact liability”105: disparate impact should not be used to “adopt racial
quotas—a circumstance that itself raises serious constitutional concerns”;106
“to impose onerous costs . . . merely because some other priority might
seem preferable”;107 to mandate “displacement of valid governmental
policies”;108 to interfere with anyone’s right to “make the practical business
choices and profit-related decisions that sustain a vibrant and dynamic freeenterprise system”;109 or to create a “double bind of liability” where
defendants risk disparate impact or disparate treatment liability on both
ends of a decision.110 Justice Kennedy did not, however, make clear how
these general concerns fit within the three-step framework, either in the
particular case or in disparate impact doctrine generally.
Analysts differ widely on how to interpret the Court’s decision in
Inclusive Communities. In light of the 5–4 opinion, Justice Kennedy’s
various caveats, and the Roberts Court’s other major disparate impact
decisions, some fair housing advocates viewed the decision as only a minor
solace,111 while other commentators welcomed it as a major progressive
victory.112 The most reasonable interpretation is that Inclusive Communities
falls somewhere between those two extremes, embracing disparate impact
as a viable tool against racial imbalances while also signaling—albeit
somewhat vaguely—that there are limits to what the Court will entertain.
What Inclusive Communities does provide, however, is a three-step
test, accompanied by a sense for what red flags might lead the Court to
104

Id. at 2514–15 (citing and quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c) (2014)).
Id. at 2522.
106
Id. at 2523.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 2522.
109
Id. at 2518.
110
Id. at 2523.
111
See Garrett Epps, The U.S. Supreme Court Barely Saves the Fair Housing Act, ATLANTIC (June
25, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/the-supreme-court-barely-saves-thefair-housing-act/396902/ [https://perma.cc/MGA6-8DW2] (“[I]t would be a mistake to read Inclusive
Communities as a ‘liberal’ decision. . . . This was no ringing victory for civil rights; it was a near-death
experience that may produce health problems for the Act down the road.”).
112
See, e.g., Emily Badger, The Supreme Court’s Housing Decision Is a Warning Against Subtle
POST:
WONKBLOG
(June
25,
2015),
Discrimination
Everywhere,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/25/the-supreme-courts-housing-decision-isa-warning-against-subtle-segregation-everywhere/ [http://perma.cc/8KNK-E5DX].
105
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reject an otherwise meritorious claim. As Part III of this Note discusses, the
case for tenants in foreclosure speaks to the primary interests behind
disparate impact, avoids the equal protection and racial quota issues that
preoccupied the Court in Ricci v. Stefano,113 and satisfies the burdenshifting framework.
III. THE DISPARATE IMPACT CASE FOR TENANTS IN FORECLOSURE
The case for tenants in foreclosure will differ depending on how the
eviction process works in a jurisdiction, what entity sought to evict, and
what law is controlling. In theory, a case could arise against a foreclosing
mortgagee or against a local body or sheriff’s department; could challenge
the actual eviction practice (the mortgagee’s, the sheriff’s, or some other
participant’s) or a state or local law;114 could take the form of a private
lawsuit, appeal of the eviction judgment itself (if the tenant is made a party
to the eviction action or is allowed to intervene), or enforcement action by
the Secretary of HUD or Attorney General;115 and could be heard by
federal, state, or HUD administrative judges.116 Because the exact claim
will differ across localities and individual circumstances, this Part will
discuss the applicability of disparate impact analysis within a typical
hypothetical locality with demonstrable racial disparities in foreclosurerelated tenant evictions (which existing research suggests apply quite
broadly),117 rather than detailing a specific challenge to a particular state
actor, mortgagee, or other party. This Part will also assume black renters as
the disparately impacted group, but the same reasoning should support a
case for any protected group that can demonstrate a significant statistical
disparity caused by applicable foreclosure laws, mortgagee practices, or
local government policies.
Before Inclusive Communities, lower courts that embraced Fair
Housing Act disparate impact applied liability fairly conservatively.
Plaintiffs prevailed in as little as 20% of cases in lower courts, and even
those victories were regularly reversed.118 As noted in Part II, the Court’s
113

557 U.S. 557, 581–85 (2009).
See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
11,460, 11,474 (Feb. 15, 2013) (interpreting disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act to apply to
both private and public actors).
115
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612–3614 (2012).
116
See id.
117
See PELLETIERE, supra note 42, at 3–4.
118
See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of
Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 399
(2013) (detailing low rates for plaintiff-favoring outcomes, and high reversal rates for those outcomes
on appeal). Professor Seicshnaydre does note, however, that the lesser financial resources of many
114
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cautious language suggests a more limited approach to housing disparate
impact than some advocates had hoped.119 This Part argues that the Court’s
various concerns about disparate impact are best seen as a threshold “step
zero” test, inquiring into the nature of the case and requested remedy before
moving on to the three-part burden-shifting analysis. The case for tenants
in foreclosure satisfies this threshold test, and should prevail on the threestep disparate impact framework in any area with significant demonstrable
racial disparities in foreclosure-related eviction.
A. Disparate Impact “Step Zero”: Constitutional Avoidance and the Fair
Housing Act “Heartland”
As discussed in Section II.B, the Court in Inclusive Communities
repeatedly expressed concerns about overly broad application of disparate
impact, without clearly articulating a limiting principle. The Court’s
embrace of disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act, however,
indicates its concerns are not fatal to the doctrine. Since some of the
Court’s preoccupations in Inclusive Communities do not fit readily into any
of the three steps of the burden-shifting framework, the most coherent and
practicable interpretation of these preoccupations is that they constitute a
kind of “disparate impact step zero,” an initial threshold step akin to the socalled “Step Zero” test in Chevron agency deference cases.120 Detailing the
parameters and full import of this threshold step for disparate impact likely
warrants a more thorough treatment than will be given here, but the
essential components of “step zero” are fairly straightforward: Courts
should (1) identify the likely disparate impact remedy in a given case, (2)
ask whether the remedy involves imposition of a racial quota or differential
treatment (what this Note calls “disparate impact vs. disparate treatment”),

plaintiffs, as well as the tendency to tack disparate impact claims onto disparate treatment cases, may
influence these results. Id. at 392–93. One study has shown similar affirmance rates for defendants in
civil appeals generally, but a higher affirmance rate for plaintiffs. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable
Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 947 (finding that defendants succeed in around 88% of plaintiff
appeals, while plaintiffs succeed in around 67% of defendant appeals).
119
For examples of advocacy for potential disparate impact cases in a variety of contexts, see Eric
Dunn & Merf Ehman, The Probable Disparate Impact of Unlawful Detainer Records, WASH. ST. B.
NEWS, July 2011, at 35 (use of detainer record in housing admissions); Allan G. King & Rod M.
Fliegel, Conviction Records and Disparate Impact, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 405 (2011) (employing
felons); Diane Piché et al., Remedying Disparate Impact in Education, HUM. RTS., Fall 2011, at 15 (the
school achievement gap); Jimmy White, Comment, Environmental Justice: Is Disparate Impact
Enough?, 50 MERCER L. REV. 1155 (1999) (siting of hazardous waste facilities). For a more exhaustive
list of further articles in the same vein, see Selmi, supra note 15, at 703 n.12.
120
See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (2006) (describing this
“Step Zero” in the agency deference context (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001)).
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and (3) ask whether the remedy risks causing a different kind of disparate
impact (“disparate impact vs. disparate impact”). If neither of the last two
concerns are implicated, the claim can proceed to the prima facie case.
The first of the Court’s primary concerns is the possibility that
disparate impact remedies might conflict with equal protection and
disparate treatment protections by mandating racial quotas or other policies
that “perpetuate race-based considerations rather than move beyond
them.”121 Justice Scalia’s warning in Ricci v. DeStefano of an “evil day on
which the Court will have to confront”122 this question seems overstated as
a broadside against disparate impact, since not all disparate impact cases
raise these “disparate impact vs. disparate treatment” risks.123 Assuming
such scenarios do raise serious constitutional ambiguity concerns centered
on the Equal Protection Clause, courts can separate at “step zero” which
individual cases do and do not create constitutional ambiguity. Courts can
ask to what extent the requested change in practice is race neutral, and
either use the constitutional avoidance doctrine to eschew particularly
problematic cases,124 or rely on the Equal Protection Clause or disparate
treatment to impute the need for a race-neutral remedy as a prerequisite for
disparate impact cases. In the case of tenants in foreclosure, providing
tenancy security after foreclosure does not require giving any advantage to
black renters or neutralizing any advantage of white renters, so Justice
Scalia’s warning need not interfere with the disparate impact analysis.125

121

Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523–
24 (2015).
122
557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
123
These concerns seem to be more acute in the employment testing context, where competition
for positions is closer to a zero-sum scenario: neutralizing black workers’ advantage necessarily
involves neutralizing white workers’ advantage. Similar concerns may cloud situations involving
competitive application for loans or apartments. Many disparate impact remedies, however, do not
involve applying counterweights to competitive processes. As Professor Richard Primus argues, even
those that do involve reallocation of benefits may be unproblematic if helping the disadvantaged group
is only a “motivating factor,” rather than the “predominant motive” behind the disparate impactavoiding adjustment. Primus, supra note 70, at 548.
124
The constitutional avoidance canon provides that a potentially unconstitutional interpretation of
a statute should be avoided where another interpretation is plausible. See LARRY M. EIG, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 23
(2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K95-RRPB] (summarizing
various articulations of the canon).
125
One can plausibly make the more radical argument that there is some constitutional risk in the
fact that disparate impact encourages actors to consider racial effects before making decisions, but such
a position implies that disparate impact itself is unsalvageable. Inclusive Communities suggests that,
while the Court is concerned about imposing liability “so expansive as to inject racial considerations
into every housing decision,” 135 S. Ct. at 2524, at least five Justices do not consider this risk fatal to
the doctrine. The “step zero” this Note advocates, then, takes a more moderate approach to these
constitutional and doctrinal concerns.
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The Court’s second major concern is the risk of penalizing good faith
actors for making rational choices.126 Unlike “disparate impact vs. disparate
treatment” issues, this concern can partially be dealt with in the “legally
sufficient justification” prong of the disparate impact framework.127 The
framework does not, however, address the “double bind of liability”
scenario the Court mentioned in Inclusive Communities, where the
defendant risks disparate impact or disparate treatment liability whichever
way it decides an issue.128 If, for example, a minority-concentrated
neighborhood has a large quantity of housing in a particularly poor
condition, the municipality must either choose to condemn the poorly
maintained properties and disproportionately evict minorities, or refuse to
condemn and leave the minority neighborhood with disproportionately
below-code housing.129 These “disparate impact vs. disparate impact”
scenarios pose practical and judicial-competence problems, but like
disparate treatment conflicts, they are not present in all cases. Allowing
tenants to stay in their homes after foreclosure perpetuates some tenancies
in segregated neighborhoods or poorly maintained buildings, but there is no
liability double bind, because honoring a lease contract does not create
liability for those disparities.130 In sum, the case for tenants in foreclosure
avoids the Court’s recent doctrinal and constitutional concerns about
disparate impact, so it survives the likeliest “step zero” limitations and
should proceed to the prima facie case.
Before discussing the prima facie case, however, it will be useful to
briefly dispense with a few other arguable Fair Housing Act-specific “step
zero” limitations, in light of Justice Kennedy’s somewhat puzzling
language about the “heartland” of disparate impact doctrine. Inclusive
Communities and prior case law suggest three axes of liability that might
bear on this “heartland”: the statutory interest at issue (segregation or
housing deprivation), the timing of the deprivation (front-end or back-end
deprivations), and the type of practice or policy being challenged (housing
barrier or housing improvement). First, it may be argued that the implied
126

Id. at 2522–23 (reasoning that disparate impact does not require “displacement of valid
governmental policies,” should not “force housing authorities to reorder their priorities,” and must give
entrepreneurs “latitude to consider market factors”).
127
See infra Section III.C.
128
See Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
129
See id. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that in the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Gallagher v.
Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), “even St. Paul’s good-faith attempt to ensure minimally
acceptable housing for its poorest residents could not ward off a disparate-impact lawsuit”).
130
There may be other potential disparate impact claims if, for example, the mortgagee in
possession does not adequately maintain the property, but that result is not mandated by the courtordered continuation of the lease, so it is a wholly separate issue and does not raise double-bind
problems.
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“step zero” in Inclusive Communities limited this heartland of liability to
“zoning laws and other housing restrictions that function unfairly to
exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods without any sufficient
justification”131—that is, to segregation cases. It is true that allowing renters
to remain in foreclosed homes, particularly in already-segregated
neighborhoods, does not directly serve the Fair Housing Act’s integration
purposes the way zoning remedies do. The Act, however, serves both
antidiscriminatory and integrationist purposes,132 and nothing in Inclusive
Communities suggests that segregation should occupy a higher tier of
liability than direct deprivation of housing. Direct deprivation actually
adheres more closely to the Fair Housing Act’s plain language, which
forbids “refus[al] to sell or rent . . . to any person because of race,”133 while
zoning rules only circuitously “make unavailable or deny”134 any definable
housing opportunity by creating a barrier to relocation.
Second, the Court points to “the heartland of disparate-impact suits
targeting artificial barriers to housing,”135 which may be taken as a sign that
Fair Housing Act disparate impact applies more readily to practices that
prevent a protected group from obtaining housing, as opposed to
deprivations of existing housing. Inclusive Communities and standard
refusal-to-rent cases (where a landlord’s policies keep out minority renters)
are both examples of what might be called “front-end” housing
discrimination, which limits the available housing options or denies the
right to obtain a particular housing. The Act, however, also clearly
contemplates “back-end” housing discrimination, which disproportionately
deprives a protected group of already-obtained housing. The phrase
“otherwise make unavailable”136 applies equally to “back-end” housing
deprivation as to “front-end” housing denial, and HUD’s regulations
explicitly reinforce that the statutory prohibition extends to “[e]victing
tenants because of their race.”137
Third, the Court in Inclusive Communities approvingly cited an article
by Professor Stacy E. Seicshnaydre,138 which found that “housing barrier”
cases—those that “deny minority households freedom of movement in a
131

Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2521–22.
See, e.g., Seicshnaydre, supra note 118, at 361 (noting the Act’s “twin purposes” of
nondiscrimination and integration).
133
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
134
Id.
135
Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2522.
136
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
137
24 C.F.R. § 100.60(b)(5) (2016).
138
135 S. Ct. at 2522.
132
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wider housing marketplace”—have had markedly greater success in federal
courts than “housing improvement” cases involving demolition,
replacement, or condition improvement.139 This distinction maps uneasily
onto back-end discrimination, seemingly relegating it to the “housing
improvement” category even when the eviction is unrelated to
improvement plans. In Professor Seicshnaydre’s view, the liability
discrepancy exists because “housing barrier” cases almost always implicate
both the integration and antidiscrimination purposes behind the Fair
Housing Act, while “housing improvement” cases often lack a clear nexus
with the Act’s integration purpose.140 A purpose-based explanation,
however, seems inadequate to explain which cases in each camp succeed or
fail, or how the twin-purpose analysis fits the disparate impact framework:
either of Professor Seicshnaydre’s “purposes” should be an independent
and sufficient basis for liability, and racially disparate deprivation in
particular is arguably more plainly prohibited by the Act than are
segregation-perpetuating practices.141
The discrepancy in liability between housing barrier and housing
improvement cases finds a more principled explanation in the “disparate
impact vs. disparate impact” situation described above. Housing
improvement-based cases often involve challenges to resident displacement
as part of local revitalization or redevelopment plans,142 situations where
the Fair Housing Act’s integration and nondiscrimination interests may
actually work at cross-purposes. The foreclosure-related eviction of
residential tenants is not part of any cognizable neighborhood development
plan,143 and does not directly implicate the thornier questions that arise
when resident displacement is balanced against attempts to otherwise
improve those residents’ quality of life.144 Thus, a tenants-in-foreclosure
139

Seicshnaydre, supra note 118, at 360–61, 363.
Id. at 420–21.
141
See SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 13, at 14–15 (describing the “perpetuation of segregation”
theory as an offshoot of traditional, discrimination-focused disparate impact cases, and noting that
either or both can be a basis for liability).
142
See, e.g., Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729, 733–34 (8th Cir. 2005)
(demolition of a low-income apartment complex as part of a redevelopment plan); Mt. Holly Gardens
Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 377 (3d Cir. 2011) (replacement of
low-income housing with higher end homes).
143
For evidence supporting the insufficiency of the economic improvement rationale here, see
infra note 176.
144
Disparate impact claims may be more difficult when residents are displaced through plans to
ultimately improve their quality of life. Notably, in recent years there has been voluminous debate
among scholars and in the popular press about the effects of gentrification and similar phenomena and
the extent to which they disadvantage poor and minority residents. Compare Vivian Yee, Gentrification
in a Brooklyn Neighborhood Forces Residents to Move on, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/nyregion/gentrification-in-a-brooklyn-neighborhood-forces140
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case does not fall within the problematic “housing improvement” category,
and any concerns about straying from the “heartland of disparate-impact
liability”145 are adequately addressed by disparate impact “step zero.”
B. The Prima Facie Case: Statistical Discriminatory Effect and Causation
Plaintiffs in disparate impact litigation must make a prima facie case
that a statistical disparate impact exists, and that the challenged policy or
practice caused that disparity.146 It is often difficult to obtain exact statistics
on foreclosure-related evictions because tenants are frequently not even
parties to the foreclosure.147 However, courts have allowed reasonable
inferences and conclusions to be drawn at the prima facie stage where there
are some gaps in the available data.148 Neither the Court nor HUD has
endorsed a particular statistical threshold for housing disparate impact,149
but disparities in foreclosure-related tenant eviction (accounting for some
level of imprecision) should clear a reasonably restrictive threshold in
many jurisdictions. The statistical showings likely surpass, for example, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) “four-fifths rule”
for Title VII claims, requiring a “selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic
group which is less than four-fifths . . . of the rate for the group with the
highest rate” to demonstrate an “adverse impact.”150 Taking the EEOC’s
somewhat arbitrary threshold as a rough statistical guideline, and assuming
that its applicability to a negative housing outcome would involve the
inverse ratio, foreclosure-related eviction in many jurisdictions would have
to demonstrate only that the practice or policy affects black renters at more
residents-to-move-on.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9NYM-N4J3] (documenting the multitudes of
tenants leaving the neighborhood of Crown Heights due to increased rent and poor conditions), with
Lance Freeman & Frank Braconi, Gentrification and Displacement: New York City in the 1990s, 70 J.
AM. PLAN. ASS’N 39, 51 (2004) (finding that gentrification in New York City actually led to slower
resident displacement), and Laura Sullivan, Gentrification May Actually Be Boon to Longtime
Residents, NPR (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/01/22/264528139/long-a-dirty-wordgentrification-may-be-losing-its-stigma [https://perma.cc/LNX9-VJ65] (discussing two studies which
suggest gentrification may be beneficial for long-term residents). Wherever one falls in this debate, the
differences of opinion support some judicial wariness about invalidating policies that displace some
minority households as part of plans to improve life in that neighborhood.
145
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522
(2015).
146
Id. at 2514.
147
See Johnson, supra note 2, at 980–81.
148
See, e.g., Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 835–36 (8th Cir. 2010) (allowing reasonable
inferences and noting several other circuits that have done the same).
149
See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
11,460, 11,468–69 (Feb. 15, 2013).
150
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (2015). For a more detailed discussion of the four-fifths rule’s history,
implementation, and potential drawbacks, see STEPHANIE R. THOMAS, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
ADVERSE IMPACT: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 30–39 (2011).
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than 125% the rate of white renters.151 The statistical proof will obviously
differ depending on the locality, but several studies indicate that a high
percentage of urban localities are likely to reveal racial disparities in
residents facing tenant foreclosure well above a 125% threshold.152
The more onerous half of the prima facie case is its “robust causality
requirement,”153 the claimant’s “burden of proving that a challenged
practice caused or predictably will cause” the statistical effect.154 The Court
in Inclusive Communities reinforced its relatively conservative approach to
disparate impact causality: for example, “[i]f a real-estate appraiser took
into account a neighborhood’s schools, one could not say the appraiser
acted because of race.”155 There is a measure of compromise and perhaps
oversimplification inherent in such analysis, since any disparate impact
causation, however immediate, implicates background social conditions
and “factors other than the defendant’s policy”156 to a degree that typical
tortious and criminal causation analyses do not. The Court asserted that the
causality requirement “protects defendants from being held liable for racial
disparities they did not create.”157
Policies and practices that result in foreclosure-related eviction should
satisfy even a rigorous causation requirement. It is true that mortgagees and
other actors in the foreclosure crisis did not “cause” the relative prevalence
of black renters, or the broad social disparities that disproportionately
placed black renters in more vulnerable housing,158 but direct causation of
the deprivation at issue is sufficient for the prima facie burden. After all, in
Griggs the plaintiff satisfied its prima facie burden159 even though Duke
Power Company did not cause disparities in black employees’ high school
diploma attainment. Likewise, the plaintiff in Inclusive Communities
151

The most likely form for this analysis would be to first compute the rates of foreclosure-related
eviction for both black and white renters over a particular period of time. The rate for black renters
would then be divided by the rate for white renters, and if the result is higher than 1.25 or some other
court-set measure, then a statistical disparate impact has been shown. See generally THOMAS, supra
note 150, at 33–34.
152
For example, one study of four New England states found that the foreclosure rate in poorer,
largely nonwhite neighborhoods was over five times the rate in white, low-poverty neighborhoods, and
that over 30% of those impacted were renters. PELLETIERE, supra note 42, at 3–4.
153
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523
(2015).
154
Id. at 2514 (emphasis added) (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2014)).
155
Id. at 2521.
156
Id. at 2514 (“If a statistical discrepancy is caused by factors other than the defendant’s policy, a
plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case, and there is no liability.”).
157
Id. at 2523.
158
At least, predatory lending practices that underlay the foreclosure crisis are likely too attenuated
from the renters to qualify as persuasive causation evidence.
159
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–32 (1971).
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survived summary judgment160 even though the zoning decision did not
cause the wealth disparities underlying blacks’ disproportionate need for
affordable housing. Moreover, unlike situations where group preferences or
personal decisions play a role in causing the disparity, there is also no
meaningful intervening choice on the part of the renters that could prevent
the deprivation.161
As noted in Section III.A, some of Justice Kennedy’s language in
Inclusive Communities might be read to suggest that policy and other
considerations might complicate strict application of the prima facie case.
After all, under a test like the EEOC’s “four-fifths” rule, large numbers of
housing policies and actions will potentially clear the bar for statistical
disparity and causation. Ultimately, though, the most logical course for
preserving neutral application of the three-part test is to embrace the prima
facie case as requiring only what it claims to: statistical disparity and a
demonstrated causal connection.162 Indeed, in Ricci v. DeStefano, the
Court’s strongest recent criticism of racial quotas, the majority conceded
“that a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability [is] essentially[] a
threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity and nothing more.”163
A plaintiff who makes such a threshold showing and seeks a race-neutral
remedy satisfies the prima facie requirement, shifting the burden to the
defendant to justify its practice.
C. Legally Sufficient Justification
HUD’s regulations state that a statistical discriminatory practice “may
still be lawful if supported by a legally sufficient justification.”164 Once the
charging party makes its prima facie case, “the respondent or defendant has
the burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve
one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the

160

Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 749 F. Supp. 2d 486, 500
(N.D. Tex. 2010).
161
Group preferences may warrant a weaker causal inference than the systemic economic duress
that leads to differences in educational and housing opportunities. If, for example, black residents of a
racially integrated community disproportionately preferred—for aesthetic reasons, and at the same price
as other homes—a building material that turned out to be hazardous, causation analysis for the
developer who sold the homes would likely require more than the mere agreement to sell to those
(disproportionately black) buyers. Similarly, the existence of other causal factors relating to the
plaintiff’s individual choices could cause courts to be wary of, for example, a disparate impact claim
based on the correlation between race and criminal history, but see Dunn & Ehman, supra note 119, at
37, though this could also be dealt with at the “sufficient justification” stage.
162
Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
163
557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (internal citation omitted).
164
24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2016).
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respondent or defendant.”165 Various courts and academics, however, have
historically differed on how high a burden the defendant bears,166 and
Inclusive Communities did not give detailed treatment to the operative
HUD language. The Court did note that this step is “analogous to the
business necessity standard under Title VII.”167 But while Title VII cases
yield a larger volume of precedent,168 they do not necessarily provide
clearer guidance as to the level of scrutiny courts should apply.169 The
standard is best understood as “impos[ing] a significant but manageable
burden,”170 somewhere above a mere “legitimate business justification,”171
but lower than “essential to the continued viability” of the enterprise, as
some have advocated.172
Beyond these general calibrations as to the onerousness of proving
“sufficient justification,” it will be useful to unpack the HUD standard
piece by piece. Breaking HUD’s language into three concrete action steps,
the defendant is required to (1) identify one or more potential interests, (2)
prove that they are substantial, legitimate, and nondiscriminatory, and (3)

165

Id. § 100.500(c)(2).
See Marcus B. Chandler, Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact
Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911, 934 (1979) (considering the defense sufficient “[i]f an
employer believes that his employment practices serve his business needs . . . whether or not his belief
is factually correct”); Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact
Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387, 388, 399 (1996) (preferring an “absolute necessity”
requirement and setting out a four-element test); George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII:
An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1312–16 (1987) (advocating an
intermediate standard, greater than a “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” but short of “scientific
standards of validity” (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
167
Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2522; see also Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s
Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,470 (Feb. 15, 2013) (“The requirement that
an entity’s interest be substantial is analogous to the Title VII requirement that an employer’s interest in
an employment practice with a disparate impact be job related.”).
168
Compare Seicshnaydre, supra note 118, at 363 (finding ninety-two total Fair Housing Act
disparate impact cases considered on appeal over a forty-year period), with Selmi, supra note 15, at 734
(finding 130 reported appellate Title VII disparate impact cases in just six combined years).
169
See Grover, supra note 166, at 387 (noting that the strictness of this stage is an “overarching
issue” of Title VII jurisprudence).
170
Rutherglen, supra note 166, at 1312. This is seemingly higher than the standard the Court
articulated in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989), but multiple sources have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as superseding Wards Cove’s more defendant-friendly
interpretation. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012)) (placing the burden on the employer to show the challenged practices
are “consistent with business necessity”); Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (recognizing
Wards Cove as superseded by statute); see also Primus, supra note 70, at 522 (“Congress in 1991 sided
with the Wards Cove dissenters, placing the burden of persuasion on the business necessity issue
squarely on defendants.”).
171
See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660.
172
See Grover, supra note 166, at 387.
166
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prove that the challenged practice is necessary to those interests.173 The
interest at issue for foreclosure-related tenant eviction may differ
depending on whether the defendant is a mortgagee or state actor. Broadly
speaking, though, there are three plausible and potentially overlapping
interests common to public and private actors alike: conveying free and
clear title to facilitate efficient resale of the property unburdened by
ongoing leaseholds; keeping mortgagees and other foreclosure-sale
purchasers from becoming unintentional landlords after foreclosure; and
passing on savings to consumers through reduced interest rates and
mortgage costs.174 Notably, the desire to avoiding declining property
values—a common rationale behind both housing-improvement and
segregation-perpetuating practices175—actually works against the defenders
of foreclosure-related eviction, because the mass evictions have left a blight
of abandoned properties, often significantly harming neighborhood
property values.176
None of these interests are themselves inherently discriminatory, so
this Section will focus on whether they are substantial and legitimate, and
whether the challenged eviction practice is necessary to achieve them. To
qualify as “substantial,” the proffered justification must be a “core interest
of the organization that has a direct relationship to the function of that
organization.”177 Broadly speaking, all three of the above interests are
directly related to mortgagee practices and housing market regulation, so
the importance of the interest will likely depend on evidence of a tangible
benefit.178 The justification “must be supported by evidence and may not be
hypothetical or speculative,”179 so it is not enough for a defendant to say,
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See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2016).
These three interests may overlap where, for example, efficient resale keeps mortgagees from
operating as long-term landlords, or increased revenue from a sale or upkeep avoidance is passed on to
consumers.
175
See, e.g., Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182, 1196 (9th Cir. 2006)
(allowing the refusal of a construction bond despite statistical disparate impact, based on a property
value protection argument). Zoning in particular is rooted in desire to protect property values. See
William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB.
STUD. 317, 318 (2004) (“[Z]oning is best understood as an alternative to currently non-existent homevalue insurance.”).
176
See Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of SingleFamily Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 57, 58 (2006) (finding
an average cumulative harm of $159,000 of each foreclosed building on nearby properties in Chicago);
Shlay & Whitman, supra note 50, at 162 (finding that “small amounts of abandonment had large,
deleterious consequences for house sales prices” in surrounding Philadelphia neighborhoods).
177
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
11,460, 11,470 (Feb. 15, 2013).
178
See id. (stating that a substantial interest analysis “requires a case-specific, fact-based inquiry”).
179
24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(ii)(2) (2016).
174
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for instance, that free and clear title makes it possible to resell at a higher
price, unless that result demonstrably and regularly follows. Defining the
line for “substantiality” may also involve some level of (at least implicit)
interest balancing, since an interest and benefit may seem less substantial if
it is significantly outweighed by the severity of the racial disparity and
disparately applied harm.180
Assuming the demonstrated interests are substantial, their legitimacy
depends on the state or municipal eviction policy at issue, as well as the
nature of the evidence offered. HUD defines “legitimate” to require
“objective facts establishing that the proffered justification is genuine, and
not fabricated or pretextual.”181 For all three proffered interests, state actors’
justifications may fail if the applicable laws that allow summary eviction of
tenants in foreclosure are holdovers from old, agrarian policy principles or
otherwise fail to consider foreclosure as a unique situation for tenants.182
Post hoc justifications for laws and policies that simply overlook tenants
should be less able to survive the “legitimacy” requirement, both because
they are pretextual and because they do not respond to current housing
realities.183
Distinct problems also arise for each of the interests detailed above.
The free-and-clear title interest is legitimate if the defendant can show
demonstrable benefits to property value, but it may be pretextual or violate
the “nondiscriminatory” requirement if there is a suggestion that the real
interest is to replace minority tenants with white tenants. For the unwittinglandlord justification, to the extent that disposing of tenants saves on
maintenance and other property management costs, avoiding the basic
building upkeep and supervision of one’s property mandated by many
localities’ building codes184 and the common law185 is hardly a “legitimate”
interest—particularly given extensive evidence that mortgagees regularly
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See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 940 (2d Cir.) (engaging
in “balancing the showing of discriminatory effect against the import of the Town’s justifications”),
aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam).
181
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at
11,471.
182
See NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., supra note 38 (summarizing various states’ limited
eviction protections for tenants in foreclosure).
183
See Johnson, supra note 2, at 978 (“Even if a lender’s eviction of an innocent tenant is arguably
grounded in the law, a blanket policy of evicting tenants is irrational given the current market
realities.”).
184
See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 13-12-126 (2016) (describing a mortgagee’s maintenance
duties for vacant buildings).
185
See Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 489–91 (2014) (summarizing
various existing common law maintenance duties imposed on landowners).
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fail to maintain abandoned properties in minority neighborhoods.186 The
consumer-savings justification is legitimate facially, but only inasmuch as
the defendant has proof independent of any savings accrued from the
illegitimate interest of avoiding landlord and upkeep responsibilities.
Proving legitimate savings may therefore depend largely on evidence that
foreclosed buildings unburdened by tenants regularly and quickly yield
higher sale prices, counter to documented effects of the evictions on the
mass-vacancy and abandoned-property epidemic.187
Finally, many mortgagees and state actors will have difficulty
showing that prompt summary eviction of tenants is a “necessary” practice.
The fact that several states and municipalities have enacted protections for
tenants in foreclosure without disastrous results for banks or local
governments weighs against a provable claim of real necessity.188 The
inadequacy of the “necessity” argument becomes still more apparent when
held against the tenants’ blamelessness in foreclosure scenarios, as well as
the often startling racial disparity statistics and onerous social costs to both
tenants and communities. While HUD does not require that a “necessary”
practice have some nexus with the people it affects, it is natural to assume
that a practice will be scrutinized more skeptically when the disparately
impacted group has no fault or stake in the challenged practice.
Homeowners impacted by foreclosure, for example, are disproportionately
black and Latino,189 but while discriminatory practices may have
contributed to this disparity, each homeowner signed onto a mortgage that
he or she later could not pay. By contrast, tenants in foreclosure are
collateral damage, lacking any culpability in the foreclosure, so a practice
186

See NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALL., supra note 51, at 2 (finding that real estate-owned “properties in
communities of color generally appeared vacant, abandoned, blighted and unappealing” while those in
“[w]hite communities generally appeared inhabited, well-maintained and attractive to real estate agents
and homebuyers”). It is true that that tenants sometimes cause additional costs by damaging and
degrading the property, but this is hardly a justification for owners’ failure to perform routine
maintenance, and tenants can still be charged for some damages to the property.
187
See WILLIAM C. APGAR, HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION FOUNDATION, THE MUNICIPAL
COST OF FORECLOSURES: A CHICAGO CASE STUDY 2 (2005), http://www.issuelab.org/
resources/1772/1772.pdf [https://perma.cc/RLP4-EK9V]; Johnson, supra note 2, at 987; NAT’L
COMM’N ON FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 5, at 34.
188
See Been & Glashausser, supra note 36, at 16–19 (detailing stronger protections in several
states); Cornelio, supra note 7, at 380 (concluding that the effect of strong state laws on foreclosing
mortgagees’ use value and investment-backed expectations is “not large”). But see Ryan K. Lighty,
Landlord Mortgage Defaults and Statutory Tenant Protections in U.S. Foreclosure and U.K.
Repossession Actions: A Comparative Analysis, 21 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 291, 305–06 (2011)
(suggesting that the Massachusetts law requiring “just cause” to evict a tenant in a foreclosed property
may be overly detrimental to stakeholders in the property). It is possible that necessity will be more
easily proved by smaller lenders or other entities that can show substantial actual or likely pecuniary
loss.
189
See NAT’L COMM’N ON FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 5, at 68.
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that displaces tenants and abrogates their bargained-for leases warrants
higher scrutiny.
Similarly, the magnitude of the deprivation at issue should tip the
scales of “necessity.” As discussed in Section I.B, sudden loss of home is a
private tragedy in itself, destabilizing families and causing dignitary harm
in addition to the unexpected expense.190 For many low-income residents,
moreover, short-notice eviction means more than a loss of one housing
option. Finding equivalent housing may not be feasible in a short
timeframe, particularly if the eviction becomes part of the tenant’s
record.191 Even after locating housing, the same tenants disproportionately
affected by foreclosure-related evictions are often those least able to take
paid time off work, hire movers, or pay a new home’s security deposit,
particularly if the last security deposit could not be recouped.192 Even free
contract principles, normally a touchstone for opponents of fair housing
regulations, do not speak strongly in the defendants’ favor: tenants cannot
bargain for mortgage health in any practical sense, as it is much less
apparent than physical conditions or neighborhood quality,193 yet there is no
eviction-related common law analogue to the implied warranty of
habitability’s minimum-conditions guarantee.194
Even if courts decide that the actual magnitude of harm to plaintiffs is
irrelevant doctrinally, harm to the surrounding communities and
municipalities is surely relevant to the persuasiveness of the defendant’s
necessity justifications. General expediency, dubious cost savings, and
adherence to archaic property law absolutisms are insufficient to show the
“necessity” of a practice that leaves vacant and unsupervised buildings,
hurts surrounding property values, causes an increase in crime in and
190

See Fried, supra note 25, at 359–61 (discussing the psychological effects of resident
displacement); Gupta, supra note 35, at 556 (suggesting that “losses of homes during the Crisis were
emotionally traumatic because people felt like they were losing parts of themselves”); Johnson, supra
note 2, at 983 (describing costs incidental to unexpected eviction).
191
See Dunn and Ehman, supra note 119, at 35–36 (describing the difficulty of finding new
housing with an unexpected eviction on one’s record).
192
See Johnson, supra note 2, at 983; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 48, at 11.
193
In many jurisdictions, tenants may be able to track down a lis pendens indicating the start of the
foreclosure process, but even sophisticated renters are unlikely to do so. See, e.g., How to Check Your
Deed, COOK CTY. RECORDER OF DEEDS, http://cookrecorder.com/how-to-check-your-deed
[https://perma.cc/N5H4-K4V6] (giving instructions for online lis pendens lookup in Cook County,
Illinois). It may be argued that the sheer prevalence of foreclosure in certain lower income communities
means that foreclosure risk is part of the lower rent bargain, but this ultimately becomes a perverse
argument, using disparate impact itself as a defense against disparate impact.
194
There are certainly eviction-related common law prohibitions—for example, forbidding
retaliatory eviction—but nothing that directly proscribes unexpected tenancy termination, beyond the
general notice requirements involving due process. See, e.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams,
462 U.S. 791, 799–800 (1983). Even these basic notice requirements are limited or nonexistent in some
states. See Mik v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 743 F.3d 149, 159 (6th Cir. 2014).
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around abandoned buildings, slows local economic opportunity, burdens
sheriffs’ departments, and generally allocates the cost and risk from the
foreclosing party to the municipality.195
D. Alternative Available Practice
If the defendant shows a legally sufficient justification for its policy or
practice, HUD’s regulation shifts the burden back to the disparate impact
plaintiff to demonstrate “that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory
interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another
practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”196 The interest that the
alternative practice must serve will differ slightly depending on whether the
particular plaintiff chooses to challenge mortgagee practices, local
ordinances, state laws, or other policies implicated in foreclosure eviction,
as discussed in Section III.C. Assuming the challenged practice survives
the sufficient-justification stage, the interest behind that practice can be
served by an alternate practice allowing for adequate time and notice
allowances for renters, thereby avoiding racially disparate evictions.
The ideal alternative practice for tenants facing foreclosure is not
immediately apparent, as adequate tenant-protection measures have proven
elusive to legislators, courts, and academics alike.197 The now-expired
Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act gives a reasonable model for basic
timing-and-notice standards, though the typical truncated process for
eviction cases results in even enacted notice requirements being regularly
ignored.198 That said, it may be unrealistic to expect courts to resolve
pervasive summary-process iniquities or coin broad new tenure-security
doctrines,199 especially as part of a disparate impact remedy. For tenants
evicted during standard one-year leases, a compromise alternate practice
based on sufficient advanced notice and the right to maintain bona fide
one-year leases has the advantage of being proven practicable, without
195

See Johnson, supra note 2, at 984–85 (“[A]id to innocent renters evicted by lenders unduly
strains public and private resources.”); supra Section I.B.
196
24 C.F.R § 100.500(c)(3) (2016).
197
Recent literature has seen calls for security of tenure and “good faith” eviction limitations, see
Deborah Hodges Bell, Providing Security of Tenure for Residential Tenants: Good Faith as a
Limitation on the Landlord’s Right to Terminate, 19 GA. L. REV. 483, 484 (1985); Roisman, supra note
7, at 819, allowing tenants to bring a “summary preliminary injunction” against eviction, Lauren A.
Lindsey, Comment, Protecting the Good-Faith Tenant: Enforcing Retaliatory Eviction Laws by
Broadening the Residential Tenant’s Options in Summary Eviction Courts, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 101, 101
(2010), and expanded due process protections, Rose, supra note 2, at 409.
198
See Rose, supra note 2, at 408–09; MARK SWARTZ & RACHEL BLAKE, LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR
BETTER HOUS., LCBH 2009 REPORT: CHICAGO APARTMENT BUILDING FORECLOSURES: IMPACT ON
TENANTS 11–12 (2010).
199
But see Roisman, supra note 7, at 840–56 (advocating new common law doctrines for renters).
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asking too much by way of judicial-procedural change. Such a solution
could resemble the admittedly imperfect protections in the PTFA,200 but a
disparate impact remedy has the advantage of yielding both injunctive
relief and the possibility of damages (at least in particularly culpable or
repeat-offender cases);201 by contrast, the PTFA was generally understood
not to provide a private right of action,202 precluding a separate remedy for
violations beyond dismissal of the eviction action, and state laws often do
not provide penalties for notice-procedure violations.203
The alternate practice is less clear for those living, as many lower
income tenants do, with oral or shorter term leases. Tenants without leases
were generally entitled to ninety-day notice under the PTFA,204 but it may
be argued that any judicially ordained protection beyond the applicable
state notice period205 warrants greater wariness, because it would actively
entitle tenants with oral leases—which are generally construed as monthly
or less206—to more tenancy security than they had under the pre-foreclosure
landlord. Nonetheless, universal ninety-day (or greater) notice would
provide protection against foreclosing mortgagees bringing mass eviction
actions and forcing tenants to prove their leases’ validity in court, rather
than first learning information about the tenants and their leases and using
good faith efforts to collect rent. Additional notice requirements integrating
tenants into the foreclosure process207 are also reasonable to protect tenants
who lack long-term leases but have had a long, stable tenure.
Even if defendants can provide a legally sufficient justification,
existing state laws and the PTFA give clear and practicable models for less
200

See Lighty, supra note 188, at 302–04; Rose, supra note 2, at 412–13.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612(g)(3), 3614(d) (2012) (listing increased penalties for repeat offenders);
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460,
11,474 (Feb. 15, 2013) (affirming HUD’s interpretation that disparate impact liability includes the
possibility of damages and penalties).
202
See, e.g., Mik v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 743 F.3d 149, 159 (6th Cir. 2014); Logan v.
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 722 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2013); Gullatt v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No.
1:10–cv–01109–AWI–SKO, 2010 WL 4070379, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2010).
203
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§ 5220 (2012)).
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discriminatory alternatives. Because these alternate practices do not cause
significant harm to mortgagees and may actually be better for housing
markets than a lease-extinguishing foreclosure regime, tenants in
foreclosure have a convincing case that judicially ordered protections are
both appropriate and necessary to avoid widespread racially weighted
eviction of innocent renters.
CONCLUSION
Mass eviction of tenants in foreclosure has a demonstrable disparate
impact on minority communities and families, without a legally sufficient
justification. Policy interests in maximally efficient use of property are
better served by alternate practices that protect tenants from unexpected
displacement and keep buildings from sitting vacant. Of course, the most
likely alternative practices could always be enacted by Congress through a
renewal of the PTFA or another PTFA-like law. Even if Congress
eventually passes such a law, achievement of a disparate impact remedy
through the courts would not be a hollow or purely stopgap victory. This is
both because the Fair Housing Act offers advantageous remedies that the
PTFA and many existing state laws do not, and because a court victory for
tenants in foreclosure would signal an increasing judicial cognizance of
renters’ vital yet vulnerable role in the modern housing marketplace.
More Americans are renting than ever, but renters are historically a
politically disempowered group, often lacking a meaningful democratic
influence when pitted against the preferences of landowners or politically
influential mortgagees; this at least partially explains the uniquely outsized
role courts have played in advancing tenants’ basic protections through
various common law doctrines. Among those who rent, a disproportionate
number are lower income black and Latino individuals and families, for
whom the security of rented homes is particularly imperative. Against this
backdrop, a disparate impact victory for tenants in foreclosure would be a
new shield against sudden displacement of families: it would signal that
even longstanding housing policies are not outside the reach of the Fair
Housing Act if they displace families and disregard the basic security of the
home along racial lines, without a pressing justification. Such policies lie at
the “heartland” of disparate impact.

273

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

274

